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We examine whether a hospital's quality is affected by the quality provided by other hospitals in the same mar-
ket. We ﬁrst sketch a theoretical model with regulated prices and derive conditions on demand and cost func-
tions which determine whether a hospital will increase its quality if its rivals increase their quality. We then
apply spatial econometric methods to a sample of English hospitals in 2009–10 and a set of 16 quality measures
includingmortality rates, readmission, revision and redo rates, and three patient reported indicators, to examine
the relationship between the quality of hospitals.Weﬁnd that a hospital's quality is positively associatedwith the
quality of its rivals for seven out of the sixteen quality measures. There are no statistically signiﬁcant negative as-
sociations. In those cases where there is a signiﬁcant positive association, an increase in rivals' quality by 10% in-
creases a hospital's quality by 1.7% to 2.9%. The ﬁnding suggests that for some quality measures a policy which
improves the quality in one hospital will have positive spillover effects on the quality in other hospitals.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Quality is a key concern for patients and policymakers in health care
markets. It is often argued that encouraging competition amongst
health care providers will improve quality, especially when prices
are ﬁxed as higher quality is then the only way in which hospitals can
attract more patients.1 There is a large empirical literature on the
relationship between quality and hospital competition (Gaynor and
Town, 2011; Gravelle et al., 2012). The bulk of the literature has
been about the US experience but some recent contributions are on
the UK and other European countries. The evidence is mixed. Kessler
andMcClellan (2000) andKessler andGeppert (2005)ﬁnd a positive ef-
fect of competition on quality, and Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) a
negative effect. Shen (2003) reports mixed results, and Shortell and
Hughes (1988) and Mukamel et al. (2001) ﬁnd no effect. Research on
the English National Health Service (NHS) for the 1990s ﬁnds that
competition was associated with lower quality (Propper et al., 2004,
2008) whereas studies of the more recent NHS experience ﬁnd that
more competition increased quality (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al.,
2010; Bloom et al., 2011).
The usual way to test whether competition affects hospital quality is
to examine the relationship between quality (oftenmeasured by hospi-
talmortality) andmeasures of competition such as theHerﬁndahl index
or the number of rival hospitals.2 In this study we test whether a
hospital's quality responds to the quality of its rivals. In industrial orga-
nisation terms, we test whether qualities are strategic complements, i.e.
whether a provider responds to an increase in quality from rival pro-
viders by increasing quality. The traditional approach tests for an effect
of competition on quality by estimating a reduced form relating quality
to ameasure of market structure. Our approach is to estimate a reaction
function to test if a provider's decisions on quality depend on the quality
decisions of rival providers. This is of interest for health care policy to
improve quality, whether by changing the structure of the market in
which hospitals operate, improving information available to patients,
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1 Prospective payment systems under which hospitals are paid a ﬁxed price dependent
on the type of case are used in the US for Medicare and Medicaid patients, in 13 European
countries including the UK, Australia, and in Korea, and New Zealand (Cyclus and Irwin,
2010; Paris et al., 2010).
2 English studies have also been able to exploit changes in policy which encouraged
hospitals to compete (e.g. Propper et al., 2008) or gave patients the right to choose from
a larger set of hospitals (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2010).
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giving them greater choice, or pay for performance schemes, since the
effect of these policies will depend on the extent to which a hospital's
own quality varies with the qualities of its rivals.
We ﬁrst outline a theoretical model of hospital quality competition
under regulated (ﬁxed) prices. The model builds on the existing litera-
ture on quality competition with regulated prices (Ma and Burgess,
1993; Gaynor, 2006; Gravelle and Sivey, 2010; Brekke et al., 2011)
which models quality competition within the simple Hotelling or
Vickrey–Salop spatial frameworks. We derive conditions under which
providers respond to an increase in rivals' quality by also increasing
quality, so that qualities are strategic complements. We show that, if ri-
vals' qualities do not affect the number of patients gained by a hospital
when its quality increases, then qualities are complements (substitutes)
if the marginal cost of treatment is increasing (decreasing) or the de-
mand responsiveness increases (decreases) when rivals' quality is
higher.
We then test whether qualities are strategic complements using
cross-section data on English hospitals in 2009–10 and a set of 16 qual-
ity measures including mortality rates, readmission, revision and redo
rates and indicators of patients' experience. Most previous work has
used a singlemeasure of quality (oftenmortality from acutemyocardial
infarction) on the assumption that different qualitymeasures are highly
correlated. We use 16 measures to see if the results are sensitive to the
choice of quality measure. We take a spatial econometric approach:
since hospitals and patients are geographically dispersed, patients
must incur travel costs to receive treatment and so hospital location af-
fects demand. Distance between hospitals hence also inﬂuences the ex-
tent to which decisions by one hospital affects decisions by other
hospitals.
We follow the approach suggested by Mobley (2003) and Mobley
et al. (2009) who examine whether prices are strategic substitutes, i.e.
whether each provider responds to an increase in rivals' prices by
reducing its own price. They estimate models in which the effect of ri-
vals' prices depends on spatial proximity. We adapt their approach to
examine competition on quality (as opposed to competition on price)
and interpret the effect of the spatial quality lag as the slope of the hos-
pital reaction function.
We ﬁnd that the qualitymeasures are poorly correlated and that the
results from regression models vary across the measures. Quality re-
sponds positively to rivals' quality for seven out of the sixteen quality in-
dicators and does not respond for the others.When an effect is detected
(for overall mortality rates, in-hospital stroke mortality, knee replace-
ment readmissions, stroke readmission within 28 days, and three indi-
cators on patients' experience), an increase in rivals' quality by 10%
increases quality by 1.7–2.9%.
Section 2 gives a brief description of the institutional setting.
Section 3 provides the theoreticalmodel. Section 4 describes the estima-
tion methods and data. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6
concludes.
2. Institutional setting
The British National Health Service (NHS) provides universal access
to healthcarewhich is funded by taxation and free to patients at point of
use.3 Geographically deﬁned local purchasers receive budgets from the
central government to fund the health care for their populations. Most
NHS hospital care is provided by public hospitals (Hospital Trusts)
which are separate from the local purchasing body but subject to tight
central ﬁnancial and regulatory control by the Department of Health.
Around half are Foundation Trusts, a status given only to hospitals
which met certain ﬁnancial and clinical requirements. Foundation
Trusts have more discretion in using surpluses (they do not have to
break even) and can borrow directly from the capital market. They
have more discretion in staff remuneration (they do not have to follow
national pay scales), they can invest in buildings and manage their
own assets (Marini et al., 2008). About 20% of the hospitals have Teach-
ing status, undertaking teaching and research, generally providing
higher quality and more specialised care, and attracting more complex
patients.
Government policy has sought to encourage hospitals to compete
via quality. Hospitals receive a ﬁxed price for each patient treated,
with prices varying by diagnosis or treatment under a prospective
price system similar to the US Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) scheme
but based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), the local version of
DRGs. The HRG system, also known as ‘Payment by Results’was initially
introduced in 2003 for a subset of procedures and then gradually ex-
panded to other types of admissions, including all types of elective
admissions.4 Money now follows the patient. Tariffs are based on na-
tional average costs of procedures (Street and Maynard, 2007) but
with adjustments according to the Market Forces Factor (MFF) index
which reﬂects exogenous geographical differences on input costs.
From 2003 private sector providers have been able to enter the NHS
market though they currently treat only a small proportion (2%) of
NHS elective patients.
Policies to make demand more responsive to quality have been in-
troduced. Since 2008 NHS patients have had the right to choose any
qualiﬁed provider (NHS or private) for elective treatment. The Depart-
ment of Health has promoted websites such as NHS Choices to provide
patients with information about hospital performance on a wide range
of quality measures.
There are also policies to directly inﬂuence quality. The Care Quality
Commission (CQC) inspects hospitals through random audits. Hospitals
that do not meet minimum national quality standards can be subject to
warning notices requiring improvements, more frequent audits, sanc-
tions or ﬁnes, prosecution, and suspension of service registration.
There are also ﬁnancial incentives for higher quality under the Commis-
sioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) scheme. NHS local pur-
chasers are required to write contracts with local hospitals which link
a set proportion of their revenue to quality indicators chosen by pur-
chasers. 2009/10 (the period of our study) was the preparatory year
for the CQUIN scheme during which 0.5% of NHS hospital revenue was
linked to achievement of quality indicators (Fichera et al., 2013).
3. Theoretical model
Denote the quality of hospital i (i= 1,.., N) as qi. The demand func-
tion of hospital i is
Xi ¼ X qi;q−i; δið Þ ð1Þ
where q−i=(q1,…, qj,…, qi− 1, qi + 1,…, qN) is a vector of the qualities
of rival providers. We assume that the demand function of provider i is
increasing in its own quality qi and decreasing in the quality of the ri-
vals: ∂Xi/∂qi N 0, ∂Xi/∂qj b 0. Hospitals are demand substitutes: patients
switch to a hospital if its quality is increased and away from it if a rival's
quality is increased.Hospitals are imperfect substitutes because of travel
costs and times, and switching costs. A marginal increase in quality qi
leads somebut not all patients to switch from the other hospitals to hos-
pital i.
The vector of parameters δi captures other factors affecting demand,
such as the location of patients and other hospitals relative to hospital i,
patient preferences over distance and quality, and central policies, for
example geographical constraints on patients' choice sets.
3 Around 15% of all elective (non-emergency) care is funded by private health
insurance.
4 Farrar et al. (2009) investigate the effect of the introduction of the HRG systemusing a
difference-in-difference methodology. They ﬁnd that the introduction of the new system
leads to a reduction in length of stay and an increase in the proportion of day cases. No ef-
fect on clinical quality was observed.
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Hospitals are prospectively ﬁnanced by a third-party payer offering
a per-treatment price p.5 We assume that all the patients demanding
treatment in a hospital are treated. The objective function of hospital
i is6
pii ¼ pXi qi;q−i; δið Þ−Ci Xi qi;q−ið Þ; qi;γið Þ; ð2Þ
where the cost of supplying hospital treatments is given by the cost
function C(Xi, qi; γi), with CX N 0, Cq N 0. The marginal cost of quality is
increasing Cqq N 0 but the marginal cost of treatment could be constant,
increasing or decreasing. We place no restrictions on the effect of vol-
umeon themarginal cost of quality. Therewould be cost substitutability
(CXq N 0), for example, if the average cost of treatment is constant with
respect to output but increasing in quality (C(Xi, qi;γi)= c(qi;γi)Xi, with
cq(qi; γi) N 0). Cost complementarity (CXq b 0) is also possible in the
presence of learning by doing (with higher volumes reducing the mar-
ginal cost of quality). γi is a vector of parameters describing exogenous
factors, such as input prices, which affect hospital i costs.
The hospitals simultaneously and independently choose qualities.
Hospitals can invest in technology and information systems that im-
prove diagnosis or treatment, introduce internal auditing, peer reviews
and other clinical governance processes, and improvemanagement and
coordination of services to patients (Joint Commission, 2012). The as-
sumption that quality of care can be chosen by hospitals (i.e. is not ex-
ogenous) is common to the extensive theoretical literature on hospital
competition,7 and, more broadly, on optimal incentive schemes for
hospitals.8 It is also consistent with the empirical evidence on hospital
competition (noted in Section 1) that suggests that hospital quality is af-
fected by competition.9
We assume that proﬁt is strictly concave in qi, which, see Eq. (6)
below, imposes further restriction on demand and cost functions.
Maximising proﬁt with respect to qi, the interior solution
10 satisﬁes
∂Xi qi;q−i; δið Þ
∂qi
p−
∂Ci Xi qi;q−i; δið Þ; qi;γið Þ
∂Xi
 
¼
∂Ci Xi qi;q−i; δið Þ; qi; δið Þ
∂qi
:
ð3Þ
Solving Eq. (3) for qi gives the reaction function for hospital i
q
R
i ¼ q
R
i q−i; δi;γið Þ: ð4Þ
We are interested in the effect of the rivals' qualities on hospital i
quality. Using the implicit function theorem on Eq. (3), the slope of
the reaction function is
∂qRi
∂q j
¼ −
∂2pii
∂q2i
 !−1
p−
∂Ci
∂Xi
 
∂2Xi
∂qi∂q j
−
∂Xi
∂qi
∂2Ci
∂X2i
þ
∂2Ci
∂qi∂Xi
 !
∂Xi
∂q j
" #
ð5Þ
where
∂2pii
∂q2i
¼ p−
∂Ci
∂Xi
 
∂2Xi
∂q2i
−
∂Xi
∂qi
∂2Ci
∂Xi∂qi
þ
∂2Ci
∂X2i
∂Xi
∂qi
 !
b 0 ð6Þ
is the second order condition.
The reaction function of provider i depends on its demand and cost
functions. Given Eq. (6), the sign of ∂qi
R/∂qj depends on the terms in
the square brackets (∂2pii/∂qi∂qj). To ﬁx ideas, consider some special
cases.
Case (i) The demand function is linear in qualities (∂2Xi/∂qi∂qj = 0),
and the marginal cost of treatment is constant and indepen-
dent of quality (∂2Ci/∂Xi
2 = 0, ∂2Ci/∂qi∂Xi = 0). Then, ∂qi
R/
∂qj=0: the quality of provider i is independent of the quality
of its' rivals.
Case (ii) The demand function is linear in qualities (∂2Xi/∂qi∂qj=0), as
in (i), but themarginal cost of treatment is increasingwith re-
spect to quantity (∂Ci
2/∂Xi
2
N 0) and themarginal cost of qual-
ity is increasing with respect to quantity (∂2Ci/∂Xi∂qi N 0).
Then ∂qi
R/∂qj N 0 and qualities are strategic complements: an
increase in a rival's quality leads to an increase in hospital i
quality. The intuition is that an increase in quality by the
rival reduces demand and therefore hospital i output at un-
changed quality qi, so that the marginal cost of treatment is
reduced (because ∂Ci
2/∂Xi
2
N 0), thereby increasing the proﬁt
margin (p−∂Ci
∂Xi
), and the marginal cost of quality is reduced
(because ∂2Ci/∂Xi∂qi N 0).
Case (iii) Conversely, if the demand function is linear in quality (∂2Xi/
∂qi∂qj=0), ∂qi
R/∂qj b 0 if themarginal cost of treatment is de-
creasing in quantity (∂2Ci/∂Xi
2
b 0) and the marginal cost of
quality is decreasing in quantity (∂2Ci/∂Xi∂qi b 0). In this
case, qualities are strategic substitutes because an increase
in the rival's quality, which reduces hospital i demand and
output at given qi, now increases the marginal cost of treat-
ment and therefore reduces the proﬁt margin from additional
treatments and increases the marginal cost of quality.
Case (iv) As a ﬁnal example, suppose that the marginal cost of treat-
ment is constant and independent of quality so that ∂2Ci/
∂Xi
2 = ∂2Ci/∂Xi∂qi = 0. Then, whether qualities are strategic
complements or substitutes depends on the sign of ∂2Xi/∂qi
∂qj. If an increase in rivals' quality increases (reduces) the re-
sponsiveness of demand to the provider's quality, then qual-
ities are strategic complements (substitutes) and the
provider increases (reduces) quality in response to rivals'
quality.
The Nash equilibrium is derived by solving the N reaction functions
qi
R = qi
R(q−i; δi, γi) simultaneously to yield
q
E
i ¼ q
E
i δ;γð Þ; i ¼ 1;…;N ð7Þ
where δ= δ1,…, δN and γ= γ1,…, γN .
We estimate reaction functions. The rationale for doing so is that
(i) it may be easier to do than to estimate the Nash equilibrium equa-
tions, and (ii) the properties of the reaction functions qi
R(q− i; δi, γi)
are crucial to predicting the Nash equilibrium effects of parameter
changes. To illustrate, suppose there are two hospitals in the market
and there is a pro competitive policy change: for examplemaking it eas-
ier for patients to switch from one hospital to another one or introduc-
ing patients' choice. Using δ to denote the policy, the effect on hospital
quality, holding the quality of other hospitals constant, is
∂qRi
∂δ
¼ −
∂2pii
∂q2i
 !−1
p−
∂Ci
∂Xi
 
∂2Xi
∂qi∂δ
−
∂Xi
∂qi
∂2Ci
∂X2i
þ
∂2Ci
∂qi∂Xi
 !
∂Xi
∂δ
" #
: ð8Þ
5 To simplify we assume that this price is sufﬁciently high that hospitals at least break
even in equilibrium.
6 We can also allow for hospital altruism by writing the hospital objective function as
u(pii, qi, Xi) with uq N 0 or uX N 0. Thiswould not alter our general conclusion that the effect
of the rivals' qualities on qi depends on the properties of the cost and demand functions.
7 See for example Brekke et al. (2011). See Gaynor (2006), Gaynor and Town (2011)
and Brekke et al. (2014) for reviews.
8 See, for example, the seminal papers by Ellis and McGuire (1986), Ma (1994), and
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b). See Chalkley (2012) for a review.
9 There is also an extensive empirical literature which shows that generally hospital
quality responds to incentives, such as report cards (Dranove et al., 2003) and pay for per-
formance (Sutton et al., 2012). See Christianson and Conrad (2011) for a recent review.
10 To rule out corner solutions we assume [∂Xi(0, q−i; δi)/∂qi][p−∂Ci(Xi(0, q−i; δi), 0; γi)/
∂Xi] N ∂Ci(X(0, q−i; δi), 0; γi)/∂qi.
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Relaxing constraints on patient choice sets will increase the number
of patients that a hospital will gain when it increases its quality, since
more patients have the opportunity to choose it. Thus demand will be-
come more responsive to quality: ∂2Xi/∂qi∂δ N 0. If price exceeds mar-
ginal cost, the ﬁrst term in the square brackets in Eq. (8) is positive.
Although demand becomes more responsive to quality, the effect of
the policy on demand for a particular hospital (∂Xi/∂δ) is ambiguous:
it depends on the relative quality of the hospitals and the geographical
distribution of patients and hospitals. Thus, even in an apparently
straightforward example of a pro-competitive policy, the direct effect
on hospital i quality holding the quality of other providers constant
(∂qi
R/∂δ) is unclear.
The effect on the Nash equilibrium quality of hospital i in this exam-
ple with two hospitals is
∂qEi
∂δ
¼
∂qRi
∂δ
þ
∂qRi
∂q j
∂qRj
∂δ
" #
Δ
−1
ð9Þ
where
Δ ¼ 1−
∂qRi
∂q j
∂qRj
∂qi
N 0 ð10Þ
and where the sign of ∆ follows from the requirement that the equilib-
rium be stable (Dixit, 1986).
We see from Eq. (9) that whilst it is not necessary for quality
to be a strategic complement for either hospital for the pro-
competitive policy to increase quality for both hospitals, in general
the magnitude of the pro-competitive effect will depend on the slopes
of the hospital reaction functions with respect to rival quality. With
identical hospitals
∂qEi
∂δ
¼
∂qRi
∂δ
1−
∂qRi
∂q j
 !−1
ð11Þ
and the direct effect of policy ∂qi
R/∂δ is ampliﬁed by interdepen-
dencies in hospital demand functions. The ampliﬁcation is increasing
in the cross effect ∂qi
R/∂qj and so is bigger when quality is a strategic
complement than when it is a strategic substitute.
Note that the assumptions required for competition policy (as cap-
tured by δ) to increase equilibrium quality are different from those for
qualities to be strategic complements. For example, if the marginal
cost of treatment is increasing in quality or quantity, and competition
policy increases aggregate demand for the provider (∂Xi/∂δ N 0), then
the effect of δ on quality is indeterminate. The competition policy in-
creases the sensitivity of demand to quality, which tends to increase
quality, but it also reduces the price-marginal cost markup, which
tends to reduce quality. With the plausible assumption that ∂Xi/
∂qj b 0, the same assumptions about the cost function imply that quali-
ties are strategic complements. If a rival provider increases quality, then
the reduction in demand for provider i leads to a reduction in its mar-
ginal cost and an increase in its price-marginal cost markup, leading
provider i to increase its quality.
4. Methods
4.1. Estimation
To test if qualities are strategic complements, strategic substitutes or
independent, we estimate the reaction function
q
R
i ¼ fi q−i; zi; εið Þ ð12Þ
where the vector zi captures observed parameters from δi, γiwhich shift
hospital i demand and cost functions and εi summarises factors we do
not observe. We specify a linear spatial lag model as
qi ¼ α þ ρ
X
j
wi jq j þ ziβ
0
þ εi ð13Þ
where wij ≥ 0 is a distance weight speciﬁed in more detail below and
wii = 0.
We can write the model in matrix form
q ¼ αþ ρWqþ zβ
0
þ ε: ð14Þ
The coefﬁcient ρ on the quality spatial lag variableWq determines
the sign of the slope of the reaction function. Notice that this speciﬁca-
tion, as inMobley (2003) andMobley et al. (2009), assumes that strate-
gic complementarity (ρ N 0) or substitutability (ρ b 0) holds between all
pairs of hospitals.
We use a row-standardised inverse distance matrix with a 30 min
travel time threshold. This is the same travel time threshold as in
Propper et al. (2004, 2008) but we also report the results from other
thresholds. Deﬁne dij as the distance between hospital i and j, and dij
30
as the distance corresponding to 30minutes travel time between hospi-
tal i and j. The weights are given by:
wi j ¼ 0 if i ¼ j;
¼
d−1i j
∑ jd
−1
i j
if di j≤d
30
i j and i≠ j;
¼ 0 if di jNd
30
i j and i≠ j
ð15Þ
The inverse distance speciﬁcation gives a lowerweight to the quality
of rivals that are more distant from hospital i. This row-standardisation
permits us to interpretWq as aweighted average of the quality of rivals,
where the weights are inversely related to the distance between the
providers. The quality of a rival is included only if the rival is within a
catchment area of 30 minutes travel time.
We estimate Eq. (14) by maximum likelihood, which is consistent
and efﬁcient in the presence of the spatial lag term, whilst OLS is biased
and inconsistent (Anselin, 1988).
The spatial lag model (14) is often presented in a reduced form as
(e.g. Le Gallo et al., 2003; Mobley, 2003; Mobley et al., 2009):
I−ρWð Þq ¼ αþ zβ
0
þ ε; ð16Þ
which can be rearranged as
q ¼ I−ρWð Þ
−1
α þ I−ρWð Þ
−1
zβ þ I−ρWð Þ
−1
ε; ð17Þ
or
qi ¼ α
X
j
ai j þ
X
k
βk
X
j
ai jz jk
0
@
1
AþX
j
ai jε j ð18Þ
where aij is the element in the ith row, jth column of (I− ρW)
−1.
The error process (I− ρW)−1εmeans that a random shock for a spe-
ciﬁc provider not only affects the quality of that provider, but also has an
impact on the quality of other hospitals through the spatial multiplier
effect (LeGallo et al., 2003). These effects are propagated to all hospitals,
so that εj and zjkwill affect qi even if hospital i ignores the quality of hos-
pital jwhen choosing qi.
11
The conventional approach is to solve the simultaneous condi-
tions (3), or equivalently (4), for the equilibrium qualities qi
E =
11 Hospital iwill not be affected by εj only if hospital j is not one of direct rivals (i.e. qjdoes
not affect its demand), and hospital j is not a second order rival of i (hospital j is not a rival
of a hospital which is a rival of hospital i), nor a third, fourth,.... order rival.
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qi
E(δ, γ) where, in general, the quality in hospital i depends on the de-
mand and cost functions of all hospitals. To produce an estimatable
speciﬁcation it is assumed that the equilibrium quality for a hospital
depends on a local subset of the demand and cost conditions for all
hospitals: qi
E = g(zi, εi). The zi, as in the spatial speciﬁcation, includes
measures of competitive structure such as the number of rivals within
some radius or Herﬁndahl indices. Although the samemeasures of mar-
ket structure may appear in zi in the conventional and spatial speciﬁca-
tions, they play different roles. In conventional speciﬁcations the
interest is in testing for an effect of competition by examining the coef-
ﬁcients on the market structure variables in zi. In the spatial speciﬁca-
tion the market structure measures in zi are covariates: the main
interest is in the sign of spatial lag to test whether rival's qualities are
strategic complements or substitutes.
4.2. Data
4.2.1. Quality measures
The literature on hospital competition and quality has used a very
limited set of quality measures, most often using hospital mortality for
admissions for acutemyocardial infarction (AMI) as themeasure of hos-
pital quality. AMI admissions are generally emergencies, where patients
exercise a very limited amount of choice. The justiﬁcations for using
AMI mortality as a quality measure in competition studies are that it
may be easier tomeasure the quality of elective care and that it reduces
endogeneity problems arising when competition measures, such as the
Herﬁndahl, are based on patient ﬂows. In this paper we usemeasures of
market structurewhich are not determined by patient ﬂows andwe use
a mix of measures of quality for both elective and emergency admis-
sions. We examine the correlations amongst them and whether the re-
sults on the effect of rivals' quality on hospital quality are sensitive to
the quality measure.
We use 16 measures of hospital quality from Dr Foster12 for the ﬁ-
nancial year 2009/10 for 147 hospitals (NHS Hospital Trusts). Details
on these measures are in the Appendix A. Six of the quality measures
are based on standardised mortality rates, seven on standardised read-
mission, revisions and redo rates, and three are derived from surveys of
patients' experiences. The mortality, readmission, revision, and redo
measures allow for the case mix of the hospital. Five of the measures
are for emergency admissions, ﬁve are for electives, and six are for both.
4.2.2. Spatial lags
For each hospital we deﬁne a catchment area of 30min car drive. On
this deﬁnition of the catchment area about one third of all hospitals are
monopolists, i.e. they do not have any other provider within a 30 min
car drive. Another third have one or two rivals. 16% have three to ﬁve ri-
vals, 12% have six to nine rivals, and only 7% have more than nine rivals
(up to amaximumof 14).We initially excludemonopoly hospitals from
our analyses. This reduces the sample of hospitals from 147 to 99 obser-
vations. Summary statistics for the smaller sample are provided in
Table 1. We check the sensitivity of our results to the deﬁnition of the
catchment area by estimating models using catchment areas of 60 min
and 98min car drive time. With a catchment area of 60 min 142 hospi-
tals have at least one rival and with a catchment area of 98 min all hos-
pitals in England have at least one rival in the catchment area.
4.2.3. Controls
In addition to the spatial lag measuring the quality of rivals within
the30min drive time catchment area,we control for thenumber of hos-
pitals within a 30 min car drive catchment area (there are on average 4
rivals). The number of hospitals within the catchment area is one of the
measures of market structure used in conventional studies of competi-
tion and quality. By including it in the model we test if it adds anything
to the explanation of hospital quality once we account for the quality of
rivals.
We use population density within 15 km from the hospital (which
approximately corresponds to a 30 min car drive) as an additional con-
trol since the demand for a hospital, and hence its incentives for quality
will depend in part on the number of potential patients in its catchment
area.
We construct three dummy variables indicating if the hospital is a
teaching hospital, a Foundation Trust, or located in London. Table 1
shows that 20% are teaching hospitals, 52% are Foundation Trusts and
24% are located in London.
We also have ameasure of overall hospital activity (the total number
of inpatient spells), and theMFF index of labour costs faced by each hos-
pital. On average a hospital has 92,000 inpatient spells. The MFF has an
average of 1.03 and varies between 0.9 and 1.2.
5. Results
5.1. Correlation amongst quality measures
Previous studies on the effect of competition on quality have used a
small sub-set of quality indicators. This may be appropriate if quality in-
dicators are highly correlated within the hospital. Tables 2A and 2B
show that this is generally not the case within our sample. The different
quality measures are not highly correlated and often not correlated at
all. This suggests that focusing on any single quality measure may lead
to a partial picture of the relation between the quality of each hospital
and its rivals. This alsomotivates our regression analysis where we esti-
mate a separate regression for each indicator.12 http://myhospitalguide.drfosterhealth.co.uk/.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean SD Min Max
Quality measures Type
Overall mortality rate B 98.28 9.50 71.85 117.93
Mortality from high risk conditions M 98.46 10.09 73.02 120.59
Mortality from low risk conditions B 90.29 27.79 31.30 150.92
Deaths after surgery B 98.31 25.50 26.33 157.36
Deaths resulting from hip fracture M 99.96 24.29 43.54 167.87
In-hospital stroke mortality M 100.91 13.07 76.10 166.07
Hip replacement readmissions L 109.09 24.24 55.29 175.31
Knee replacement readmissions L 102.60 36.46 0.00 219.41
Stroke readmission within 28 days M 105.91 18.98 60.44 158.08
Hip revisions and manipulations
within 1 year
L 1.09 0.63 0.00 3.51
Knee revisions and manipulations
within 1 year
L 0.55 0.78 0.00 7.14
Hip fracture — operation given
within 2 days
M 67.47 11.51 42.83 94.31
Redo rates for prostate resection L 4.13 1.99 0.00 9.23
Clean Hospital room/ward B 85.95 2.95 79.00 93.70
Involved in decisions B 69.68 3.31 60.00 77.40
Trust in doctors B 88.16 2.27 81.50 92.90
Controls
Number of rivals within 30 min car
drive
3.99 3.50 1.00 14.00
Teaching hospital 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Foundation Trust 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Total number of inpatient spells (in
thousands)
91.73 42.09 28.59 216.77
Staff MFF 1.03 0.10 0.91 1.20
Population density within 15 km 2217 2046 264.16 7256
London Trust 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Note. B:measures quality of both elective and emergency admissions.M:measures quality
of emergency admissions. L: measures quality of elective admissions. Summary statistics
for 99 hospitals with at least 1 rival with 30 min drive time.
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5.1.1. Correlation amongst mortality rates
Table 2A reports correlation matrix for the six mortality indicators.
The overall mortality rates are highly correlated with mortality from
high-risk conditions (0.8) since are a large component of overallmortal-
ity rates, but correlations are in the range 0.29–0.35 with other mortal-
ity indicators. Mortality rates from high-risk conditions have
correlations in the range 0.25–0.49withmortality rates other thanover-
all mortality. Mortality rates from low-risk conditions have a low corre-
lation with any other measure (in the range 0.14–0.35). The correlation
between death after surgery and any other measure is in the range
0.02–0.29. Deaths resulting from hip fracture have a correlation of
0.37 with mortality rates of high risk conditions (again due to some ex-
tent to the ﬁrst being included in the second), of 0.33 with overall mor-
tality and between 0.16 and 0.2 with any other mortality indicator. In-
hospital stroke mortality rates have a correlation of 0.49 with mortality
rates of high risk conditions (again due to some extent to the ﬁrst being
included in the second), of 0.32 with overall mortality rates and be-
tween 0.02 and 0.16 with the other mortality indicators.
5.1.2. Correlation amongst readmission rates, revision rates and redo rates
Table 2A also shows that hip readmissions have a correlation of 0.32
with knee readmissions and of only 0.07 with stroke readmissions.
There is very low correlation with the other measures (in the range
−0.05 to 0.02). Note that, perhaps surprisingly, there is no correlation
between hip readmissions and hip revisions (0.01), and between hip
readmissions and the proportion of operations within 2 days following
a hip fracture (0.02). Knee readmissions have a correlation of 0.32
with hip readmissions and only 0.09 with stroke readmission. There is
very low correlation with other measures (in the range −0.06 to
0.11). As for hip replacements and revisions, there is no correlation be-
tween knee readmissions and knee revisions (−0.06). Stroke
readmissions have a low correlation with all other measures (0.01 to
0.09). Hip and knee revisions have a correlation of 0.38 but there is
low correlation with any other measure (in the range−0.06 to 0.11).
Redo rates for prostate resection have low correlation with any other
measure (in the range−0.06 to 0.11). The proportion of hip fracture pa-
tients with an operation within two days has a low correlation with all
othermeasure (in the range−0.02 to 0.11). Note that this last indicator
is a positive quality measure whilst the others are negative.
5.1.3. Correlation between readmission and mortality rates
The correlation between readmission andmortality rates is general-
ly low and varies between −0.18 (knee revisions and mortality
from low risk conditions) and 0.16 (death from hip fracture and stroke
readmissions). Note that there is no correlation between stroke read-
mission rates and stroke in-hospital mortality rates (0.04).
5.1.4. Correlation between patients' experience and other quality indicators
Table 2B reports on the correlations of patient experiencewith other
indicators. The three indicators of patients' experience have correlations
between 0.46 and 0.76. Since patient experience measures quality pos-
itively and mortality or the readmissions measure it negatively, one
would expect a negative correlation between patient experience and
the other quality measures. The correlation ranges between 0.02 and
−0.24.13
13 The correlations between the three patients' experience variables tend to be higher
compared to those between indicators based on mortality or readmission rates. An alter-
native approachwould be to construct an aggregate patient experience indicator, perhaps
by principal component analysis. However, this approach would make the interpretation
of the coefﬁcients in the regression analysis more difﬁcult. To keep the presentation more
transparent we prefer to investigate each indicator separately.T
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5.2. Regression results
We use Moran I's statistic to test departures from spatial random-
ness. Table 3 reports signiﬁcant positive spatial correlation for nine of
the 16 qualitymeasures (overallmortality,mortality fromhigh risk con-
ditions, deaths after surgery, in-hospital stroke mortality, knee replace-
ment readmissions, stroke readmission within 28 days, clean hospital
room/ward, involved in decisions, and trust in doctors). In no case
there is signiﬁcant negative spatial correlation.
Table 4 reports the results from spatial regressionmodels formortal-
ity rates. The ﬁrst column suggests that teaching hospitals have 8.4%
lower overall mortality rates and an increase in rivals' quality by 10% in-
creases quality by 2.8%. For mortality from high risk conditions teaching
hospitals also have higher quality and hospital activity increases the
mortality rates. However, rivals' quality is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The third and fourth columns are for themortality from low-risk condi-
tions, and deaths after surgery. None of the covariates or the quality of
other hospitals signiﬁcantly affects these two measures of mortality.
The ﬁfth column suggests that hospitals with a Foundation Trust status
have 9.3% lowermortality rates following hip fracture. Finally, for stroke
mortality, an increase in rivals' quality by 10% increases quality by 1.8%.
Table 5 has the results for hip and knee readmissions. Hip replace-
ment readmissions are lower for providers in areas with higher costs
(proxied by the MFF) and with higher population densities. Knee read-
mission rates are 23% lower in teaching hospitals and an increase in ri-
vals' quality by 10% increases quality by 2.3%. Similarly, stroke
readmission rates are smaller in teaching hospitals and are smaller if ri-
vals have smaller stroke readmission rates. Teaching hospitals also have
lower hip revision rates (by 34%). None of the covariates or the quality
of rivals are signiﬁcant in columns 5 and 6 (knee revisions and operation
within two days for hip fracture patients). In column 7 higher costs,
volume and population density are associated with higher redo rates
for prostate resection.
In Table 6 column 1 suggests that patients in Foundation Trust hos-
pitals are more satisﬁed about cleanliness and that an increase in rivals'
quality by 10% increases the quality by 1.8%. In column 2 patients in
teaching hospitals and Foundation Trusts have higher satisfaction with
their involvement in decisions and an increase in rivals' quality by 10%
increases the quality by 2.5%. Finally, in column 3 patients have greater
trust in doctors in teaching hospitals and an increase in rivals' quality by
10% increases quality by 2.9%.
On the whole, the results suggest that teaching hospitals perform
better: quality is signiﬁcantly better for seven of the 16 qualitymeasures
and noworse for the others. This is in linewith expectation since teach-
ing hospitals tend to attract better qualiﬁed doctors. Although teaching
hospitals treat more severely ill patients, this is taken into account by
the casemix standardisation of the quality measures. Foundation hospi-
tals have lower hip mortality rates and better patients' satisfaction in
two of the three dimensions. Hospitals who apply for Foundation status
have to satisfy a number of ﬁnancial and clinical requirements and this
may explain their higher quality. For two quality indicators (mortality
from high-risk conditions and prostate redo rates), larger hospitals as
proxied by larger total inpatient spells have worse quality. Large hospi-
talsmay suffer from congestion effects struggling to copewith large vol-
umes of patients. Higher personnel costs, as proxied by staff MFF, is
associated with lower quality for three measures (two readmission
rates and one patient satisfaction). Although hospitals are compensated
for higher costs, the compensation is partial and therefore hospitals
with higher MFF will have stronger incentives to cut costs, which in
turnmaymakemore difﬁcult tomaintain high quality standards. Hospi-
tals in London have generally similar quality to other hospitals (except
that London hospitals have higher hip-replacement readmissions).
Our focus is on whether a hospital's quality is correlated with the
quality of its rivals. We ﬁnd a positive correlation (a positive spatial
lag coefﬁcient) for seven of the quality measures (overall and stroke
mortality, knee and stroke readmission, and for the three patient satis-
faction measures). The positive coefﬁcient indicates that qualities are
strategic complements. The overall mortality rates are also used as a
key performance indicator by regulators. Hospitals may compare them-
selves against nearby hospitals on this measure.
The positive spatial lag for all three patient satisfaction measures
may be because patient satisfaction has a greater effect on demand
than other measures. Unlike the other quality measures the three mea-
sures of patients' subjective experience are not casemix adjusted to
allow for patient characteristics. These characteristics may vary across
areas and also affect patients' reporting behaviour. We do however in-
clude control variables which are likely to be correlated with patient
characteristics. For example, the MFF variable is based on input prices
and is thus related to the income and education levels of the population.
Population density will also capture differences between patients in
rural and urban areas, and the London indicator also captures popula-
tion density, education and income to a certain extent.14
Table 3
Moran's I statistics for quality measures.
Quality measures: Moran's I p-value
Overall mortality rate 0.340 0.000
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.294 0.001
Mortality from low risk conditions −0.029 0.429
Deaths after surgery 0.160 0.034
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 0.018 0.378
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.180 0.020
Hip replacement readmissions 0.013 0.403
Knee replacement readmissions 0.205 0.011
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.204 0.012
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.004 0.546
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.011 0.548
Hip fracture — Operation given within 2 days 0.001 0.449
Redo rates for prostate resection 0.125 0.077
Clean hospital room/ward 0.365 0.000
Involved in decisions 0.311 0.000
Trust in doctors 0.321 0.000
Note: The expected value for Moran's I statistic if there is no spatial correlation is
E(I) = −1/(N-1) = −0.010. The reported p-value is based on an empirical distribution
using 10,000 permutations.
14 Whenwe allow for further socioeconomic variables (within hospitals catchment areas)
the impact of the rivals quality is almost unchanged (results reported in Table A1).
Table 2B
Correlations amongst satisfaction, mortality, and readmissions.
Mortality from high
risk conditions
Deaths from
hip fracture
Hip replacement
readmissions
Stroke
readmission
Clean Hospital
room/ward
Involved in
decisions
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 0.37 1
Hip replacement readmissions 0.04 −0.04 1
Stroke readmission −0.03 0.17 0.07 1
Clean Hospital room/ward 0.02 0.03 −0.1 −0.17 1
Involved in decisions −0.14 −0.04 −0.18 −0.24 0.5 1
Trust in doctors −0.15 −0.06 −0.04 −0.22 0.46 0.76
Note: absolute correlation of 0.21 required for signiﬁcance at 1%. N = 146.
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A conventional measure of competition (the number of rivals within
30min car drive) is not signiﬁcant in any of the models. As we noted in
Section 3, the conditions required for qualities to be strategic comple-
ments (i.e. having a positively sloped reaction function) are different
from those required for competition to affect quality.We also estimated
the models in Tables 4–6 omitting the number of rivals and obtained
similar results on the effect of the rivals' quality (available on request).
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
We replicated the analyses with the catchment area set to 60 min
and to 98 min travel time. Larger catchment areas imply that the num-
ber of competitors is also larger and reduces the number of hospitals
with no rivals. With a catchment area of 60 min 142 hospitals have at
least one competitor in the catchment area. With a catchment area de-
ﬁned by 98 min travel time all hospitals in England have at least one
rival in the catchment area.
Tables 7 and 8 report spatial lags from models with samples based
on the 60 and 98 min drive time catchment areas and with the same
speciﬁcations as those reported in Tables 4 to 6. The results from
Tables 7 and 8 are generally weaker compared to those with a smaller
catchment area. The spatial quality lag is signiﬁcant for overall mortali-
ty, knee replacement readmissions and patients' involvement with a
60 min drive time catchment area. With a 98min drive time catchment
area the spatial lag is signiﬁcant only for the overall mortality and trust
in doctors.
Table 4
Spatial models of hospital competition and risk adjusted mortality rates.
Overall mortality
rate
Mortality from high
risk conditions
Mortality from low
risk conditions
Deaths after
surgery
Deaths from hip
fracture
In-hospital stroke
mortality
Number rivals within 30 min 0.962
(1.542)
0.870
(1.201)
−0.860
(−0.379)
−0.851
(−0.440)
−0.388
(−0.202)
0.633
(0.616)
Teaching hospital −8.430***
(−3.471)
−5.782**
(−2.047)
4.248
(0.477)
−1.728
(−0.227)
−8.102
(−1.081)
−2.736
(−0.679)
Foundation Trust −2.174
(−1.254)
−0.970
(−0.481)
1.957
(0.310)
−3.852
(−0.711)
−9.307*
(−1.731)
−0.161
(−0.057)
Total inpatient spells (1000) 0.0189
(0.878)
0.0463*
(1.851)
−0.0139
(−0.178)
0.0144
(0.214)
−0.0179
(−0.271)
0.00880
(0.246)
Staff MFF −22.85
(−1.596)
−26.12
(−1.562)
9.959
(0.194)
−15.92
(−0.363)
−44.87
(−1.031)
−5.235
(−0.227)
Population density within 15 km −0.00242
(−1.582)
−0.00214
(−1.207)
0.000447
(0.080)
0.00186
(0.391)
0.00136
(0.289)
0.00139
(0.553)
London Trust 4.013
(0.739)
3.688
(0.585)
−2.535
(−0.128)
−21.01
(−1.236)
−2.334
(−0.139)
−6.480
(−0.721)
Constant 96.59***
(5.115)
107.0***
(4.960)
86.39
(1.581)
115.2**
(2.421)
150.5***
(3.178)
83.91***
(3.222)
ρ (Spatial quality lag) 0.276***
(2.895)
0.164
(1.635)
−0.0438
(−0.386)
0.0511
(0.463)
0.0276
(0.244)
0.179*
(1.645)
Sigma2 57.09***
(6.956)
77.01***
(7.007)
757.1***
(7.033)
550.7***
(7.033)
542.8***
(7.035)
154.4***
(6.996)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99
BIC 730.267 757.972 983.297 951.798 950.305 827.043
t-statistics in parentheses * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Table 5
Spatial models of hospital competition and risk-adjusted readmission, revision and redo rates.
Hip
replacement
readmissions
Knee
replacement
readmissions
Stroke
readmission
within 28 days
Hip revisions and
manipulations
within 1 year
Knee revisions and
manipulations
within 1 year
Hip fracture —
Operation given
within 2 days
Redo rates for
prostate
resection
Number rivals within 30 min 2.295
(1.215)
2.939
(1.048)
−0.383
(−0.264)
0.0347
(0.692)
−0.0904
(−1.548)
0.0826
(0.090)
−0.181
(−1.256)
Teaching hospital 4.088
(0.555)
−23.41**
(−2.133)
−10.00*
(−1.783)
−0.336*
(−1.706)
−0.137
(−0.601)
0.220
(0.061)
0.267
(0.477)
Foundation Trust −4.279
(−0.806)
0.451
(0.058)
−2.431
(−0.604)
0.0279
(0.201)
0.139
(0.856)
3.025
(1.186)
0.309
(0.773)
Total inpatient spells (1000) 0.0137
(0.211)
0.136
(1.396)
−0.0228
(−0.456)
0.000649
(0.376)
−0.00125
(−0.619)
−0.0292
(−0.918)
0.00965*
(1.947)
Staff MFF −120.7***
(−2.786)
−30.52
(−0.482)
19.25
(0.585)
0.822
(0.721)
0.838
(0.635)
26.11
(1.261)
10.08***
(3.066)
Population density within 15 km −0.00845*
(−1.832)
−0.00256
(−0.372)
0.00455
(1.286)
−0.0000263
(−0.215)
0.000221
(1.545)
0.000251
(0.112)
0.000586*
(1.656)
London Trust 39.90**
(2.430)
12.02
(0.488)
−11.66
(−0.930)
0.0316
(0.072)
0.159
(0.311)
−3.427
(−0.429)
−1.827
(−1.461)
Constant 237.7***
(4.857)
93.60
(1.391)
68.00**
(1.998)
0.163
(0.139)
−0.295
(−0.215)
44.05**
(1.969)
−7.406**
(−2.202)
ρ (Spatial quality lag) −0.0415
(−0.377)
0.225**
(2.310)
0.167*
(1.646)
−0.00910
(−0.080)
−0.194
(−1.397)
−0.0357
(−0.331)
−0.0143
(−0.127)
Sigma2 521.5***
(7.034)
1157.7***
(6.983)
304.2***
(7.006)
0.368***
(7.036)
0.502***
(6.967)
123.6***
(7.034)
3.023***
(7.035)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
BIC 946.377 1027.201 893.993 227.872 260.092 803.867 436.426
t-statistics in parentheses * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
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We suspect that a catchment area of 60 or 98 minutes is too large.
Since England is densely populated and competition amongst hospitals
is mainly local, a travel time of more than an hourmay include hospitals
which do not compete. The average number of providerswithin a catch-
ment area of 60min is about eight which is more than double the num-
ber with a 30 min catchment area. If hospitals which are more than
30 min drive time apart are not competing, using a spatial quality lag
calculated including such hospitals will tend to reduce the estimated ef-
fect of the spatial lag. This dilutionwill be exacerbated becausewith row
standardised inverse distanceweights, includingmore rivalswill reduce
the weight on the quality of nearby genuine rivals. In short, increasing
the catchment area beyond 30 min drive time may produce a less rele-
vant spatial measure of the quality of rivals.
We also estimated models with our preferred catchment area of
30 min drive time but, instead of dropping monopoly hospitals with
no rivals within 30 min, we included them with a spatial lag of zero
and added a monopoly dummy to the regression.15 The results are in
Table 9. These models with 147 hospitals have signiﬁcant positive
spatial lags for overall mortality rates, deaths after surgery, patients' in-
volvement, and trust in doctors. The results are thus broadly consistent
with those in Tables 4–6 though less precise, presumably because the
spatial lag variable has less variation with 48 observations having a
value of zero.
We have also run our preferred speciﬁcation with a catchment area
of 30 min drive time but included beds as an additional weight when
computing the distance matrix. Intuitively, we would expect that,
other things equal, having rivals with more capacity would increase
the effect of a change in their quality on a hospital's demand and
hence on its quality. The results are reported in Table 10 and are very
similar to those in Tables 4–6, suggesting that allowing for rivals' capac-
ity makes little difference.
We also estimatedmodelswithout the number of rivals andwith the
number of rivals weighted by distance. Results are similar to those in
Tables 4–6.16
Since our results are from cross-sectional observational data, there is
always a risk of omitted variable bias, which in this context is also
known as the reﬂection problem (Manski, 1993). Spatial dependence
in quality may arise because there is interdependence of decisions or
because there are unmeasured factors, affecting quality choices, that
are common to a region or a catchment area. Our analysis controls for
a number of hospital characteristics and most quality measures are
risk-adjusted (except for patient-reported ones). But there may remain
some unmeasured factors. For example, more skilled doctors (who pro-
duce better patient outcomes) are more likely to have more choice of
hospital to work in and to choose to live in areas with better amenities
and higher quality of life. Or individuals living in certain areas may be
characterised by poor dietary habits and lifestyle (not captured by risk
adjustment) leading to worse health outcomes.
As an additional robustness check, to reduce the risk of omitted var-
iable bias, we added more controls. Table A1 in Appendix A reports es-
timates of the spatial quality lag when we include as additional
controls seven indices of socio-economic deprivation (for Income, Em-
ployment, Health and Disability, Education Skills and Training, Barriers
to Housing and Other Services, Crime, and Living Environment).17 In
Table A1 each deprivation index is separately added to the baseline
model. The results show that the coefﬁcient of the spatial quality lag is
highly robust to the inclusion of these additional covariates. However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the spatial lag is due to informa-
tional spillovers: if hospital A is physically close to hospital B, then it
may be more likely that hospital A will know about a technology used
by hospital B and adopt the new technique used at hospital B.
Our theoretical model suggests that the spatial lag would be greater,
other things equal, when demand is more responsive to quality. Hence
wemight expect that the spatial lagwould be greater for quality of elec-
tive conditions (such a hip replacements) than for quality of emergency
conditions (such as hip fractures) where patients exercise less choice
and are more likely to be treated in the nearest hospital.18
Six of our quality measures are not speciﬁcally measures of elective
or emergency care (overall mortality, deaths after surgery, mortality
from high risk conditions, and the three patient experience measures).
For the ten condition-speciﬁc measures, three have positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant spatial lags. The largest of these is for knee replace-
ment readmissions – an elective quality measure – and the other two
are for stroke which is an emergency condition. Of the remaining
seven spatial lags which are not signiﬁcantly different from zero, two
are for emergency conditions and ﬁve for elective conditions. These
mixed results suggest that comparison of the magnitude of the spatial
lags from elective and emergency conditions is not a robust method of
15 The inclusion of 48 monopoly hospitals in the sample of 147 hospitals potentially af-
fects estimates of both the effect of the spatial lag and of the effect of the number of rivals.
Formonopolists (whohaveno rival within 30 km) the spatial lag is set to zero. Only four of
the 16 quality measures have an observed minimum of zero across hospitals and so the
spatial lag, being a weighted average of the quality of a subsample of hospitals, is also al-
ways greater than zero for all observations for these 12 quality measures. Moreover for
these 12 quality measures, zero is at least 3 standard deviations (and usually more) away
from than the mean. For the other four quality measures the coefﬁcients of variation are
0.7, 1.7, 2.0, and 2.8. Thus setting the value of the spatial lag for monopolists to zero leads
to a high proportion of observations (48 out of 147) having a spatial lag which is a consid-
erable distance in SD units from the other observations. If the original regression line be-
tween own quality and the spatial lag estimated for the sample of 99 non-monopolists has
a positive slope, adding the monopolists to the sample will reduce the slope of the regres-
sion line between own quality and the spatial lag of quality unless the average quality of
themonopolists lies below the intercept of the regression line estimated on the sample ex-
cluding themonopolists. Given the large difference between the zero spatial lag of themo-
nopolists and the average spatial lag of non-monopolists this seems unlikely. We also
estimated the models for the full sample of 147 hospitals with the spatial lag measured
for rivals within 30 kmwithout a monopoly dummy, for the two quality regressions with
the most signiﬁcant spatial lags (overall mortality, trust in doctors). In both cases (results
available on request) the spatial lag becomes very small and insigniﬁcant and the coefﬁ-
cient on the number of rivals is also smaller and has smaller lower t statistic.
16 See Tables 7–9 of Gravelle et al. (2013).
17 These variables are measured at small area level from census data, known as
Lower Super Output Areas – LSOAs – (each area covering on average a population of
1500 individuals) and then attached to the hospital if the centroid of the LSOA falls within
the catchment area of the hospital. The data on socio-economic deprivation was obtain
from the Neighbourhood Statistics (http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/).
18 Since the spatial lags are weighted averages of quality and the dependent variable is
quality, the coefﬁcient on the spatial lag (rho) is dimensionless and can be compared
across different quality measures.
Table 6
Spatial models of hospital competition and patient experience.
Clean hospital
room/ward
Involved in
decisions
Trust in the
doctors
Number rivals within 30 min 0.0245
(0.122)
0.0849
(0.374)
0.202
(1.383)
Teaching hospital 1.126
(1.446)
2.322***
(2.601)
1.988***
(3.491)
Foundation Trust 1.181**
(2.110)
1.096*
(1.735)
0.399
(0.983)
Total inpatient spells (1000) 0.00532
(0.771)
0.00139
(0.177)
−0.000366
(−0.073)
Staff MFF −3.750
(−0.794)
−5.856
(−1.125)
−6.670**
(−1.962)
Population density within 15 km −0.000113
(−0.230)
−0.000230
(−0.413)
−0.000294
(−0.817)
London Trust −1.026
(−0.590)
0.0368
(0.019)
0.237
(0.187)
Constant 73.50***
(6.679)
57.66***
(6.092)
69.02***
(6.843)
ρ (Spatial quality lag) 0.179*
(1.814)
0.245**
(2.499)
0.285***
(2.924)
Sigma2 5.854***
(7.003)
7.567***
(6.972)
3.122***
(6.946)
Observations 99 99 99
BIC 503.052 529.558 442.783
t-statistics in parentheses * p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
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testing the underlying theory. Moreover, some of the empirical litera-
ture on hospital competition discussed in Section 1 reports that com-
petition affects quality as measured by mortality for AMI, an
emergency condition, suggesting that there could be spatial lags
amongst quality for emergency conditions.
5.4. Falsiﬁcation test
We also undertook falsiﬁcation tests. If demand for a hospital speci-
ality depends on the quality of that speciality, rather than on the quality
of other specialities in the hospital, then there should be no spatial
Table 7
Spatial quality lag from models with 60 min car-drive time catchment area.
Mortality rates Spatial lag
(t)
Readmission/revisions/redo rates Spatial lag
(t)
Patient experience Spatial lag
(t)
Overall mortality rate 0.324**
(2.419)
Hip replacement readmissions −0.108
(−0.656)
Clean hospital room/ward 0.0881
(0.595)
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.0736
(0.458)
Knee replacement readmissions 0.248*
(1.755)
Involved in decisions 0.281**
(2.307)
Mortality from low risk conditions 0.0210
(0.142)
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.157
(1.105)
Trust in doctors 0.206
(1.611)
Deaths after surgery 0.163
(1.123)
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year 0.119
(0.734)
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 0.0911
(0.584)
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.265
(−1.232)
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.0372
(0.244)
Hip fracture — operation given within 2 days 0.0699
(0.498)
Redo rates for prostate resection −0.125
(−0.848)
Models include the same covariates as those in Tables 4 to 6. Observations: 142. t-statistics in parentheses.
* p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Table 8
Spatial quality lag from models with 98 min car-drive time catchment area.
Mortality rates Spatial lag
(t)
Readmission/revisions/redo rates Spatial lag
(t)
Patient experience Spatial lag
(t)
Overall mortality rate 0.396**
(2.100)
Hip replacement readmissions 0.178
(0.776)
Clean hospital room/ward 0.119
(0.499)
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.243
(1.120)
Knee replacement readmissions 0.195
(0.885)
Involved in decisions 0.275
(1.408)
Mortality from low risk conditions −0.0157
(−0.063)
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.278
(1.347)
Trust in doctors 0.328*
(1.732)
Deaths after surgery 0.304
(1.521)
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year 0.308
(1.367)
Deaths resulting from hip fracture −0.0594
(−0.215)
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.409
(−1.208)
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.219
(0.899)
Hip fracture — operation given within 2 days 0.0956
(0.491)
Redo rates for prostate resection −0.195
(−0.731)
Models include same covariates as those in Tables 4 to 6. Observations: 147. t-statistics in parentheses.
* p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
Table 9
Spatial quality lag with monopolists (30 min car-drive time catchment area).
Mortality rates Spatial lag
(t)
Readmission/revisions/redo rates Spatial lag
(t)
Patient experience Spatial lag
(t)
Overall mortality rate 0.287***
(3.004)
Hip replacement readmissions −0.00705
(−0.063)
Clean hospital room/ward 0.192**
(2.059)
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.198**
(1.986)
Knee replacement readmissions 0.230**
(2.419)
Involved in decisions 0.232**
(2.434)
Mortality from low risk conditions −0.0417
(−0.378)
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.140
(1.374)
Trust in doctors 0.269***
(2.756)
Deaths after surgery 0.0617
(0.563)
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.0296
(−0.267)
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 0.0451
(0.414)
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.241*
(−1.848)
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.169
(1.487)
Hip fracture — Operation given within 2 days −0.0513
(−0.475)
Redo rates for prostate resection −0.0125
(−0.106)
Models include the same covariates as those in Tables 4 to 6 plus indicator for hospitals with no rivals within 30 min drive time. Observations: 147. t-statistics in parentheses. * p b 0.10,
** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
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correlation between the quality of, say, the orthopaedics department in
a hospital and the quality of cardiology departments in rival hospitals.
However, if there are unobserved region-speciﬁc factors, such as
population morbidity, affecting all types of quality, then we would ob-
serve signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the spatial lag of cardiology quality in
a model of orthopaedic quality.
Table 11 reports the estimates of the spatial lag from models in
which the dependent variables shown in the top row of the table are
regressed on the usual covariates and spatial lags of a different type of
quality as indicated in the ﬁrst column. Since we detect a signiﬁcant
own spatial lag for overall mortality rates, we regress overall mortality
on spatial lags of quality variables that also have a signiﬁcant own
spatial lag, i.e. two of the patients' satisfaction variables (patient self-
reported involvement and trust in doctors), and two of the readmission
variables (knee and stroke).We do not run regression of overall mortal-
ity against other mortality variables, since by construction they are
included in overallmortality. The results are reported in theﬁrst column
of Table 11. We also examine the relationship between mortality rates
of different clinical conditions, for example regressing deaths resulting
from hip fracture against the spatial lag of in-hospital stroke mortality
(last column in Table 11). Similarly we examine the relationship
between readmissions for different clinical conditions, for example
regressing hip or knee readmissions on the spatial lag of stroke
readmissions. We also test whether hip and knee readmissions and
mortality from low risk conditions respond to the spatial lag of patient
satisfaction measures (second, third and fourth column of Table 11).
With one exception, the spatial lag is never signiﬁcant in these
models. The exception is for the regression of hip replacement
readmissions against the spatial lag of knee replacement readmissions,
though this is only statistically signiﬁcant at 10% level. Since this can
be plausibly explained by both procedures being performed within
the same speciality, we suggest that the falsiﬁcation tests do not reject
a causal interpretation of the spatial lag in Tables 4–6.
6. Conclusions
Wehave investigated the effect of the quality of rivals on a hospital's
quality using a spatial-econometrics framework. Our theoretical model
implies that the quality of a provider responds to the quality of its rivals
when the marginal cost of treatment is increasing and/or the respon-
siveness of demand to quality increases in rivals' quality. Our empirical
analysis using recent English data suggests that this is the case for seven
of the 16 quality indicators, where quality is signiﬁcantly a strategic
complement. We do not ﬁnd any cases where rivals' qualities are nega-
tively correlated with provider quality.
Table 11
Falsiﬁcation tests: spatial quality lag.
Dependent variable
Spatial lag variable Overall
mortality rate
Hip replacement
readmissions
Knee replacement
readmissions
Mortality from low
risk conditions
Deaths resulting
from hip fracture
Hip replacement readmissions 0.000222
(0.004)
0.388
(1.656)
Knee replacement readmissions −0.0421
(−1.373)
0.149*
(1.699)
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.0606
(0.963)
0.0126
(0.069)
0.126
(0.449)
Involved in decisions 0.0207
(0.053)
−1.592
(−1.444)
−0.556
(−0.324)
−0.883
(−0.659)
Trust in doctors −0.152
(−0.249)
−1.554
(−0.888)
−1.554
−3.091
(−1.149)
−3.448
(−1.652)
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.135
(0.453)
Models include the same covariates as those in Tables 4 to 6. 99 observations. The cells contain the coefﬁcient on the spatial lag (and t statistic) frommodels in which the dependent var-
iable is indicated in the column heading and the quality variable used for the spatial lag is indicated in the horizontal row.
Table 10
Spatial quality lag ρwith bed weights (30 min car drive time catchment area).
Mortality rates Spatial lag
(t)
Readmission/revisions/redo rates Spatial lag
(t)
Patient experience Spatial lag
(t)
Overall mortality rate 0.280***
(3.025)
Hip replacement readmissions −0.0549
(−0.503)
Clean hospital room/ward 0.190*
(1.935)
Mortality from high risk conditions 0.183*
(1.856)
Knee replacement readmissions 0.217**
(2.208)
Involved in decisions 0.254***
(2.649)
Mortality from low risk conditions −0.0269
(−0.237)
Stroke readmission within 28 days 0.144
(1.407)
Trust in doctors 0.295***
(3.083)
Deaths after surgery 0.0408
(0.366)
Hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.0171
(−0.149)
Deaths resulting from hip fracture 0.0374
(0.335)
Knee revisions and manipulations within 1 year −0.193
(−1.376)
In-hospital stroke mortality 0.179
(1.624)
Hip fracture — Operation given within 2 days 0.00836
(0.080)
Redo rates for prostate resection −0.0329
(−0.283)
Models include the same covariates as those in Tables 4 to 6. Observations: 99. t−statistics in parentheses.
* p b 0.10, ** p b 0.05, *** p b 0.01.
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Patient's satisfaction measures on cleanliness, doctors' trust and
patient's involvement show the most consistent positive association
with rivals' quality. Two of six mortality rates (overall mortality and
in-hospital stroke mortality) and two readmission measures (knee
and stroke) respond to rivals' quality. When an effect is detected our
preferred models, with hospital markets deﬁned by catchment areas
of 30 min drive time, suggest that an increase in rivals' quality by 10%
increases a hospital's quality by 1.7%–2.9%. The results are generally ro-
bust to the use of larger catchment areas (60min or 98min drive time).
Our results are broadly in line with the model of hospital prices in
Mobley et al. (2009) where the estimated spatial lags implied that a
10% reduction in the rivals' price reduces prices by a hospital's price
by 2.3%–2.8%.
The results suggest that providers may respondmore to variations in
rivals' quality for those quality dimensions that are more easily observ-
able to patients (like cleanliness and patient's involvement) and less to
clinical ones. Our theoretical framework suggests that this result may
be rationalised by the plausible assumption that demand ismore respon-
sive to patient experience quality measures than to clinical ones, so that
providers have a stronger incentive to respond when patients of rivals
have a better experience in their hospitals. This effect may be reinforced
in the presence of social networks where patients share information on
hospital experience with individuals living in the same neighbourhood
(Moscone et al., 2012) or if the marginal cost of improving patient expe-
riences is lower than the marginal cost of clinical quality. Our results are
also relevant for the assessment of policies, other than those affecting
competition amongst hospitals, which aim at improving quality, for ex-
ample via guidelines, since they suggest that therewill be beneﬁcial spill-
overs as quality improvement in one provider will lead to quality
improvements by its rivals.
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Appendix A. Quality measures
The quality measures (accessed 14 May 2012) are from:
http://www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/quality-reports
http://www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/patient-experience
Mortality rates
Mortality data provided by Dr Foster are risk adjusted. A logistic re-
gression is used to estimate the expected in-hospital mortality. Each
measure is adjusted for differences in casemix: sex, age on admission,
admission method, socio-economic deprivation, primary diagnosis, co-
morbidities, number of previous emergency admissions, ﬁnancial year
of discharge, palliative care, month of admission, ethnicity and source
of admission.
The overall standardised mortality rates cover all in-hospital deaths,
i.e. all spells whosemethod of discharge was death. Stroke and hip frac-
ture mortality rates are for spells whose primary diagnostic code was
acute cerebrovascular disease (ICD10: G46, I60-I64, I66) or fracture
neck of femur (ICD10: S720-S722). Standardised deaths after surgery
refer to surgical patientswhohad a secondary diagnosis such as internal
bleeding, pneumonia or a blood clot and subsequently died.
High risk conditions includemortality from spells whose primary di-
agnosis is one of ﬁve groups: Acute myocardial infarction (ICD10: I21,
I22), Acute cerebrovascular disease (ICD10: G46, I60-I64, I66), Pneumo-
nia (ICD10: A202, A212, A310, A420, A430, A481, A78, B012, B052,
B250, B583, B59, B671, J12-J16, J170-J173, J178, J18, J850, J851), Conges-
tive heart failure–nonhypertensive (ICD10: I50) and Fracture of neck of
femur–hip (ICD10: S720-S722). Low risk conditions include all in-
hospital mortalities from all conditions with a death rate lower than
0.5%. This includes more than 100 diagnosis groups.
Readmission rates are for hospital readmissionswithin 28 days from
discharge for patients admitted for stroke, knee and hip replacement.
Stroke, knee and hip replacement standardised readmission ratios are
the ratio of observed number of spells with emergency readmissions
within 28 days of discharge with a knee replacement procedure (proce-
dure/OPCS code O18, W40-W42, W5[234][1389](+Z844-6), W580-
2(+Z846)), a hip replacement procedure (W37-W39, W93-W95) or
an acute cerebrovascular disease diagnostic (ICD10: G46, I60-I64, I66),
to the expected number of readmissions for each procedure. The ex-
pected number is estimated using a logistic regression that adjusts for
the same factors as in the standardisation for in-hospital mortality.
The readmission rate attributed to a given hospital is for all patients
who were treated in that hospital and readmitted within 28 days in
that same hospital or any other hospital.
Revisions
The knee or hip revisions and manipulations within 1 year are the
proportion of joint replacements with a revision procedure within
365 days of the initial (index) procedure, over the total number of
joint replacements carried out at the trust over a three year period.
Redo rates
Redo rates for prostate resection are the rates of endoscopy
resection of outlet of male bladder procedure (OPCS code: M65)
spells where a second operation was performed within three
years. The denominator includes all transurethral resection of the
prostate procedures discharged between April 2004 and March
2007.
Hip fracture operationswithin two days is the percentage of patients
with a fracture neck of femur primary diagnoses (ICD10: S720-S722)
that received a related procedure (W code) within two days.
Patients' experience
Patients' experience measures are derived from the 2009 NHS
Inpatient Survey for the Care Quality Commission which is adminis-
tered to a random sample of patients in all acute trusts. The vari-
ables relate to three questions to patients: 1) “In your opinion
how clean was the hospital room or ward?” (Clean hospital room/
ward). The patient could give one of ﬁve possible answers: very
clean, fairly clean, not very clean, not at all clean. Dr Foster mea-
sures the proportion of patients who found the hospital or room
very clean or clean. 2) “Were you involved as much as you wanted
to be in decisions about your care and treatment?” (Involved in de-
cisions). The patient could answer: yes, deﬁnitely; yes, to some ex-
tent; no. Dr Foster measures the proportion of patients who
answered yes. 3) “Did you have conﬁdence and Trust in doctors
treating you?” (Trust in doctors). The patient could answer: yes, al-
ways; yes, sometimes; and no. Dr Foster measures the percentage of
patients who answered yes.
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